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ABSTRACT
This Article proposes a reassessment of current methods for valuing
compensation owed by host States for breaches of non-expropriation stan-
dards of investment treaties, when the host State breaches such standards
in order to fulfill obligations to its citizens under the International Cove-
nant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The ICESCR
minimum core obligations continue to have binding force during finan-
cial crises, despite the latter's impairment of host States'fiscal resources
and social protection capabilities. Current investment arbitraljurispru-
dence involving financial crises show that tribunals have not adjudged
host States implementing interventionist social protection measures to be
responsible for direct or indirect expropriation, but rather for violating
other treaty standards such as the 'fair and equitable treatment" clause.
Arbitral tribunals have generally determined compensation for such
breaches by referring to a 'fair market value" standard, more synchro-
nous with assumptions of perfectly competitive markets. However, the
process of determining compensation for breaches of non-expropriation
standards is governed by the general law of international responsibility,
of which compensation is only one of the forms of reparations. Under the
law of international responsibility, compensation is not intended to be
punitive or expressive, but is evaluated according to the objective conduct
of both the injuring State and the injured State, in order to reach the
most equitable outcome that redresses damage to the injured State.
Investment arbitral tribunals determining compensation for a host
State's non-expropriation breaches should, thus, be similarly obliged to
reach for equitable outcomes, rather than automatically resorting to theflawed definition of the 'fair market value" standard.
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This Article shows that States, in conjunction with the Committee on
Economic, Social and Economic Rights ("the Committee"), jointly define
the minimum core obligations particular to their respective jurisdictions
in light of resource constraints, governmental capacities, and growth
prospects. While minimum core obligations are not static concepts, they
can nonetheless be empirically determined and institutionally verified, as
shown in the settled practices of the Committee in working with State
Parties to the ICESCR. The Article then synthesizes current tribunals'
approaches in valuing compensation for breaches of non-exprophation
treaty standards in times of economic crises (primarily through the 2001-
2002 Argentine financial crises), and reveals latent methodological
defects from using a broad 'fair market value" standard, without con-
sidering equitable adjustment factors and other comparable arbitral prac-
tices that focus more narrowly on past performance, rather than future
earnings projections for compensation in times of emergencies. Finally,
the Article suggests a valuation proposal that recasts country risk pre-
mium to factor in the host State's obligation to fulfill the ICESCR mini-
mum core obligations as a fixed constraint on government resources,
even in times of financial or economic crisis.
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"Concerns have sometimes been expressed that the principle of full
reparation may lead to disproportionate and even crippling requirements so
far as the responsible State is concerned. The issue is whether the principle
of proportionality should be articulated as an aspect of the obligation to
make full reparation. In these Articles, proportionality is addressed in the
context of each form of reparation, taking into account its specific character.
Thus restitution is excluded if it would involve a burden out of all
proportion to the benefit gained by the injured State or the other party.
Compensation is limited to damage actually suffered as a result of the
internationally wrongful act, and excludes damage which is indirect or
remote. "
1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROSPECTS OF ICESCR-DRIVEN
MITIGATION OF COMPENSATION
Compensation in international law has never been a precise sci-
ence. Throughout international legal history, the determination
of reparations has differed widely with regard to quantum, mode of
settlement, and the means of enforcement upon States.2 Compen-
sation owed for injuries that are partly endogenously determined
by a State's acts (such as through governmental measures that
result in material deprivation or injury), and partly exogenously
1. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, at
236, art. 34 cmt. 5, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001)
[hereinafter 2001 ASR] (internal citations omitted).
2. See BORzu SABAHi, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRA-
TION 7-55 (2011); Richard M. Buxbaum, A Legal History of International Reparations, 23
BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 314, 314 (2005) (describing modem shift in focus from state-centered
to individual- and societal-centered rights and obligations in reparations).
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caused by an economic emergency,3 introduces another intriguing
layer of complexity to an already variable regime within interna-
tional law.
Compensation awards in international investment arbitrations
involving host State measures taken during economic emergencies
manifest these significant variances in the estimation of both the
quantum and the components of compensation to injured inves-
tors. While the 2005 CMS Gas v. Argentina tribunal declared that
the Argentine financial crisis "cannot be ignored and . .. has spe-
cific consequences on the question of reparation,"4 those conse-
quences have never been specified or explained in the arbitral
awards to date that have dealt with the question of the Argentine
financial crisis.5 Instead, most tribunals have rejected Argentina's
extreme interpretation of the necessity defense, which calls for the
outright inapplicability of an investment treaty during a situation
of self-judged emergency or necessity within the host State.6
Where arbitral tribunals have relied upon the necessity defense as
defined under Article 25 of the International Law Commission
(ILC) 2001 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internation-
3. For the taxonomy of economic emergencies, see CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH
ROGOFF, THIS TIME Is DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 3-14 (2009).
4. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, 406 (Apr. 25, 2005).
5. See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
Decision on Liability, 11 226-66 (Oct. 3, 2006); Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Repub-
lic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on Argentina's Application for Annulment of
the Award, 159-223 (June 29, 2010); CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/
01/8, 315-35, 354-94; Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Award, 303-45 (May 22, 2007) (1 355-405 in the Decision on the Application for
Annulment); Cont'1 Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, f
107-81, 189-236 (Sept. 5, 2008); BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final
Award, 11 367, 369, 381-90, 407-12 (Dec. 24, 2007); Nat'l Grid PLC v. Republic of Argen-
tina, UNCITRAL, Award, 1 250-62 (Nov. 3, 2008); Suez v. Argentine Republic (Suez &
Vivendi), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, 11 249, 257-71 (July 30,
2010); Total SA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability,
482-85 (Dec. 21, 2010); El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/15, Award, 11 552-670 (Oct. 27, 2011); Impregilo SpA v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Final Award, 1 336-60 (June 21, 2011); Metalpar v. Argen-
tine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5, Award on the Merits, 1 208-11 (June 6, 2008).
6. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATfY Doc. No. 103-2 [hereinafter U.S.-Arg. BIT], provides:
"This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for
the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the main-
tenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essen-
tial security interests." For a full discussion of the interpretive issues regarding necessity
clauses in international investment treaties like Article XI of the U.S.-Arg. BIT, see DIANE
A. DESIERTO, NECESSITY AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY CLAUSEs: SOVEREIGNTIY IN MODERN
TREATY INTERPRETATION 145-236 (2012).
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ally Wrongful Acts ("2001 ASR"), Argentina was ultimately found to
have failed to meet the high evidentiary threshold required to
prove all the elements of this defense.7  These elements are as
follows:
Article 25. Necessity
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for pre-
cluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an
international obligation of that State unless the act:
(a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential inter-
est against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State
or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the interna-
tional community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the pos-
sibility of invoking necessity; or
(b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.8
Article 27(a) of the 2001 ASR imposes the requirement that the
State invoking necessity must comply with the international obliga-
tion breached as soon as the circumstance precluding wrongful-
ness (in this case, the state of necessity) has terminated.9
Likewise, Argentina has generally not succeeded in advancing a
drastic interpretation of specific Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)
7. Tribunals found that the requirements of Article 25 of the 2001 ASR were not met
in: EDF Int'l SA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award, 1 1169-81
(June 11, 2012); CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 315-31; Enron
Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 294-313; BG Grp. PLC, UNCITRAL, It 388-412;
Nat'1 Grid PLC, UNCITRAL, f 255-62; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 344-55 (Sept. 28, 2007); Suez & Vivendi, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19, t 257-65; Total SA, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability, 345
(Dec. 21, 2010); Impregilo SpA, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, 344-59. Another instance
when an arbitral tribunal rejected the customary defense of necessity under Article 25 of
the 2001 ASR is Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6, Award, 11
105-06 (Apr. 15, 2009). On the other hand, the defense under Article 25 of the 2001 ASR
was accepted in LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 245-59. Article 25 of
the 2001 ASR was treated as a norm assisting in the interpretation of the defense of neces-
sity under the investment treaty (Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT)) that was partly accepted in Continental Casualty Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/
03/9, 1 168, 192-219.
8. 2001 ASR, supra note 1, art. 25.
9. 2001 ASR, supra note 1, art. 27 states:
Article 27. Consequences of invoking a circumstance precluding wrongfulness
The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in accordance with
this chapter is without prejudice to:
(a) Compliance with the obligation in question, if and to the extent that the
circumstance precluding wrongfulness no longer exists;
(b) The question of compensation for any material loss caused by the act in
question.
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provisions on "measures not precluded" that involve "essential
security interests" (otherwise known as "necessity clauses"). Under
Argentina's interpretation, the entire treaty no longer applies
when a host State decides to implement any measure whatsoever
that it deems necessary to serve its "essential security interests."10
The logical consequence of this interpretation would be that no
breach can arise from an inapplicable treaty.
The foregoing interpretive theory is gainsaid by the actual tex-
tual formulations of these necessity clauses, the plain letter of
which are altogether silent on the alleged effect of treaty inapplica-
bility." The majority of arbitral awards reported to date have
rejected this theory, frequently holding Argentina liable for dam-
ages incurred by investors as a result of governmental measures
taken during its 2001-2002 financial crisis.' 2 These governmental
measures were deemed to breach non-expropriation standards,
such as the "fair and equitable treatment" (FET) standard, in
Argentina's investment treaties.13 The purpose of the FET stan-
10. Diane A. Desierto, Necessity and Supplementary Means of Interpretation of Non-Precluded
Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 827, 831, 850, 876, 922-23
(2010) [hereinafter Desierto, Necessity and Supplementary Means]; see also DESIERTO, supra
note 6, at 173-74 (citing Sempra Energy Int'l, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16; CMS Gas Trans-
mission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8; LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1;
Enron Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3; Total SA, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1; Suez &
Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19; Impregilo SpA, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17).
11. Article XI of the U.S.-Arg. BIT provides: "This Treaty shall not preclude the appli-
cation by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the ful-
fillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international
peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests." See Desierto,
Necessity and Supplementary Means, supra note 10, at 879, 928.
12. Argentina's interpretation (e.g., the effect of treaty inapplicability for non-pre-
cluded measures) has been rejected in: CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/
01/8, 11 353-73, 389-92; Enron Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 331-39; El Paso
Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 613-15 (Oct. 27,
2011); Sempra Energy Int'l, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 1 364-97; Nat'1 Grid PLC,
UNCITRAL, It 250-53; Impregilo SpA, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, 1 337-43. Signifi-
cantly, in the 2012 award in EDF Int'l SA, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, 1153-54, Argen-
tina did not argue the effect of treaty inapplicability: "Article 5(3) comprises a general
exception for acts which occurred during extraordinary circumstances that would other-
wise be contrary to the State's obligations under the BIT. Under such circumstances, the
BIT would, according to Respondent, oblige the State only to provide national treatment
and most favorable treatment to foreign investors."
13. See, e.g., Suez v. Argentine Republic (Suez & Interagua), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/
17, Decision on Liability, 1 174-228 (citing Articles 3 and 5(1) of the Argentina-France
BIT and Article IV(1) of the Argentina-Spain BIT); ElPaso Energy Int'l Co., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/15, 1 326-519 (citing Art. 11(2) (a) of the 1991 Argentina-United States BIT);
Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 1 324-77 (June
23, 2006) (citing Art. 11(2) (a) of the 1991 Argentina-United States BIT); Compania de
Aguas del Aconquija SA v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, 1 7.4.1-7.4.12
(Aug. 20, 2007) (citing Art. 3 of 1993 Argentina-France BIT); Total SA, ICSID Case No.
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dard, as originally used in BIT practice, "is to fill gaps that may be
left by the more specific standards, in order to obtain the level of
investor protection intended by the treaties . . . The systematic
location and operation of the clauses in existing investment trea-
ties is reminiscent of general codes in civil law countries that set
forth a number of specific rules and complement these with a gen-
eral clause of good faith as an overarching principle that fills gaps
and informs the understanding of specific clauses."14
The arbitral awards in El Paso, LG&E, Impregilo, Sempra, Azurix,
Enron, CMS, BG Group, Suez, and Total held that the measures
Argentina implemented during its 2001-2002 financial crisis
breached the FET standard in the BITs at issue in each case, and
adjudged compensation as the appropriate form of reparations
under the general law of reparations codified in Articles 36 et seq.
in the 2001 ASR.15 The same awards rejected the claims against
Argentina for alleged violations of the direct or indirect expropria-
tion provisions of the investment treaties in these cases.16 While
the expropriation provisions in the treaties often contained an
explicit requirement of payment of prompt, adequate, and effec-
tive compensation, the treaties' provisions on the FET standard did
not provide a similar requirement of payment of compensation
upon breach.17
The award in Comparlia de Aguas del Aconquia SA and Vivendi Uni-
versal SA found that Argentina violated the FET standard, the full
protection and security standard, and the BIT provision on expro-
priation, and thus applied methods of compensation arising from
both general international law (for breaches of FET and full pro-
ARB/04/1, 1 125-27 (citing Art. 3 of the 1993 Argentina-France BIT); Impregilo SpA,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, 284-331 (citing Art. 2(2) of the Argentina-Italy BIT).
14. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT LAW 122 (2008).
15. See, e.g., El Paso Energy Int' Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 1 752; LG&E Energy
Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 267 (Oct.
3, 2006); Impregilo SpA, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, pt. VI; Sempra Energy Int'l, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/16, Award, 486; Azurix Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 442; Enron
Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 453; CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/
01/8, 472; Nat'l Grid PLC, UNCITRAL, 296; BG Grp. PLC, UNCITRAL, t 413-18; Suez,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/117, 248; Total SA, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, 485.
16. El Paso Energy Int'l Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 265-80; LG&E Energy
Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 185-200; Impregilo SpA, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17,
It 268-83; Sempra Energy Int'l, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 1 280-86; Azurix
Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 11 314-22; Enron Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 11
234-350; CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 252-64; Nat'l Grid PLC,
UNCITRAL, 296; BG Grp. PLC, UNCITRAL, 1 144-55, 244-72; Suez &Interagua, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/17, 1 117-51; Total SA, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, 1 191-99.
17. U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 6, art. VI.
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tection and security) and the BIT (for violation of the expropria-
tion provision).' 8  Arbitral tribunals uniformly refer to
compensation as a form of reparations embraced by the Chorzdw
standard, under which the injured party is to be returned to its
position had the injury not occurred.' 9 Nonetheless, their valua-
tion methods exhibit marked differences owing to the broad mar-
gin of arbitrator discretion in determining "financially assessable
damage" within the purview of Article 36 of the 2001 ASR.
Argentina did not seek mitigation of damages or reduced liabil-
ity by arguing that its measures were taken to ensure continued
compliance with international social and economic rights. 2 o
Rather, the amicus curiae brief in the Suez v. Argentina case, submit-
ted by five non-governmental organizations in 2007, first advanced
this position by proposing a method of interpretation of funda-
mental social and economic rights in relation to a BIT.2 ' The
thirty-page amicus brief in SueZ2 2 identified the applicable human
rights involved to be the right to water, right to life, and related
rights.23 The Suez amici argued that these human rights are
included in the relevant applicable law to the dispute as "rules of
international law" under Article 42(1) of the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, 24 and
as such, could be read to assist in the interpretation of the ""FET
standard and the "indirect expropriation" standard in the BIT.2 5
The bulk of the analysis in the Suez brief was devoted to this novel
reinterpretation of the FET and indirect expropriation. 26 Towards
the end of its argument, the amici briefly mentioned that:
18. Compania de Aguas del Aconquifa SA, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 11 11, 11.1.
19. Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 47 (Sept. 13)
("The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act-a principle
which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions
of arbitral tribunals-is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe-out all the conse-
quences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible,
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the
award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution
in kind or payment in place of it-such are the principles which should serve to determine
the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law.").
20. See Suez & Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19.
21. Id. 256.
22. See Brief for Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales et al. as Amici Curiae, Suez &
Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (July 30, 2010) [hereinafter Brief for Centro de
Estudios Legales y Sociales].
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id. at 13-14.
25. Id. at 15-16, 21.
26. Id. at 19, 21, 23, 24.
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Human rights law could displace investment law in a conflict of
norms situation. . .[which] could arise if the Tribunal were to
find, for example, that the backdrop of a severe economic crisis,
the guarantees offered to foreign investors with respect to the
concession's economic equilibrium were incompatible with the
government's duty to ensure access to water to the population.27
The amici chose not to develop this argument further, however,
finding that it was not necessary for the adjudication of the case.28
This Article builds its analysis from key pronouncements in the
2010 Suez award and the 2005 CMS award. First, the Suez tribunal
acknowledged that in a time of emergency, a host State remains
bound to observe both its international human rights obligations as
well as its investment treaty obligations.29 The tribunal did not elu-
cidate this point further, as it found that on the facts of the case
Argentina had not shown its inability to fulfill both sets of obliga-
tions at the time of the 2001-2002 financial crisis.s0 Second, while
the CMS tribunal acknowledged that the 2001-2002 Argentine
financial crisis would have "specific consequences on the question
of reparation,"1 the ultimate award of compensation did not spec-
ify those consequences. These developments in tribunal reasoning
spur this Article's proposal that a host State's good faith compli-
ance with the minimum core obligations under the International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) dur-
ing economic emergencies can, and indeed should, be taken into
account in the process of valuing the compensation attributable to
the same host State for injury caused to investor rights.
27. Id. at 26.
28. Id.
29. Suez & Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 262 reads as follows:
The third condition for the defense of necessity: Treaty obligation does not exclude the neces-
sity defense. The texts of the three BITs in question do not specifically exclude or
allow the admissibility of a defense of necessity... Argentina and the amicus curiae
submissions received by the Tribunal suggest that Argentina's human rights obli-
gations to assure its population the right to water somehow trumps its obligations
under the BITs and that the existence of the human right to water also implicitly
gives Argentina the authority to take actions in disregard of its BIT obligations.
The Tribunal does not find a basis for such a conclusion either in the BITs or
international law. Argentina is subject to both international obligations, i.e., human
rights and treaty obligation, and must respect both of them equally. Under the circumstances
of these cases, Argentina's human rights obligations and its investment treaty obligations
are not inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually exclusive. Thus, as discussed above, Argen-
tina could have respected both types of obligations. Viewing each treaty as a whole, the
Tribunal does not find that any of them excluded the defense of necessity.
Therefore Argentina must be deemed to have satisfied the third condition for the
defense of necessity.
Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. 262.
31. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, 406 (Apr. 25, 2005).
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Part II of this Article describes the State-driven consultative
process of determining a state's minimum core obligations under
the ICESCR as the obligatory baseline after a State joins the
ICESCR. While this baseline may be empirically dynamic over
time, it is nevertheless still capable of broad-based identification
through the established monitoring practices and reportage pro-
cess facilitated by the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights (the Committee) together with ICESCR Member
States, specialized agencies of the United Nations, as well as non-
governmental organizations, considered in conjunction with the
substantive content of such minimum core obligations as devel-
oped by the Committee over the years in its General Comments.32
During economic crises, the Committee can exercise its mandate
from the United Nations Economic and Social Council to continu-
ously consult with, and elicit information from, the aforemen-
tioned constituencies and States parties to the ICESCR, in order to
determine the scope and mode of observance of such applicable
minimum core obligations by States.
Part III then shows that most arbitral tribunals confronted with
breaches of non-expropriation standards in investment treaties
during financial crises or emergencies tend circuitously to refer to
the "fair market value" standard defined in the treaty for compen-
sation of expropriation. This Article argues that tribunals award-
ing compensation on the basis of the "fair market value" standard
do not adequately consider other salient factors for determining
what ought to be merely "financially assessable damage" as the
standard of compensation under Article 36 of the 2001 ASR. This
Article draws particular attention to the concepts of "mitigation" of
compensation arising from the equitable conduct of the parties, as
well as other tribunals' use of "past performance" yardsticks33 in
compensating losses arising from emergencies. In line with these
concepts, this Article submits that a host State's good faith compli-
32. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Rep. on the 5th Sess., Nov. 26-Dec.
14, 1990, at 83, 1 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1990/8, Annex III; ESCOR, Supp. No. 3 (1991)
[hereinafter General Comment 3]; see also Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Sub-
stantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment 12, 17, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May
12, 1999) [hereinafter General Comment 12]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment 14, 43, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4
(Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment 14]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security (Art. 9), 59, U.N. Doc. E/
C.12/GC/19 (Feb. 4, 2008) [hereinafter General Comment 19].
33. Instead of "lost profits or lucrum cessans."
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ance with the ICESCR minimum core obligations during an eco-
nomic emergency should be deemed an acceptable ground within
the general law of reparations for equitably reducing the quantum
of investment compensation awards.
Part IV suggests that the discount rate predominantly used
should also capture the host State's duty to fulfill ICESCR mini-
mum core obligations as a fixed constraint on government
resources in times of financial crises. This can be done in two ways:
first, through the estimation of the investment beta (which tracks
the sensitivity of the investment's returns relative to overall market
returns), and second, through the estimation of the country risk
premium (which refers to the additional risk associated with invest-
ing in a particular country). Both the investment beta coefficient
and the country risk premium should be adjusted upwards, in
order to reflect the inherent uncertainty of the range of govern-
ment policies that may be adopted to fulfill the ICESCR minimum
core obligations during economic crises.34 The upward adjustment
of the investment beta and the country risk premium will result in
a more realistic discount rate, and ultimately a less bloated assess-
ment of the value of an investment at the time the host State
imposes governmental measures to fulfill its ICESCR obligations.
In Part V, the Article submits that the proportionality require-
ment built into the structure of the law of reparations must be
restored in the award of compensation in investment arbitrations
involving host State measures taken in a time of financial or eco-
nomic cnses. The fair market value standard, as defined under
assumptions of perfect competition in the International Glossary of
Business Valuation Terms, cannot be treated as the default mea-
sure under the general law of international responsibility, which
only refers to "financially assessable damage" in Article 36 of the
2001 ASR. The determination of compensation under this Article
is intended to produce the "equitable outcome" for both the
injured State and the injuring State-the same requirement should
not be overlooked when the injured party is an individual or insti-
tutional investor. While the ICESCR minimum core obligations
likewise require estimation and verification, arbitral tribunals can
invite the Committee to extend amicus expertise in particular cases
when a State asserts that its injurious acts to investors were commit-
ted to fulfill its ICESCR minimum core obligations in good faith
during an economic emergency. Host States still retain the onus
34. See Lubos Pastor & Pietro Veronesi, Uncertainty About Government Policy and Stock
Prices, 67J. FIN. 1219, 1252-55 (2012).
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probandum to show that their invocation of ICESCR compliance is
not made simply as a pretextual afterthought to avoid international
responsibility elsewhere.
II. ICESCR MINIMUM CORE OBLIGATIONS DURING
ECONOMIC EMERGENCIES
A. Shifting between Paradigms ofJusticiability and Treaty Monitoring
Admittedly, while ICESCR rights have been more prevalent
objects of domestic judicial enforcement,35 they have not yet been
tested as decisive lis mota in contentious cases before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ has explicitly articulated
some aspects of the nature of ICESCR rights and a State's likely
breach of such rights only through an advisory opinion.36 In the
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Temitory, the ICJ declared that Israel, as
the Occupying Power, "is bound by the provisions of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Further-
more, it is under an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the
exercise of such rights in those fields where competence has been
transferred to Palestinian authorities."37
The ICJ also considered the relevance of international human
rights obligations, including several ICESCR provisions on: (1) the
right to work, protection, and assistance accorded to the family and
to children and young persons, (2) the right to an adequate stan-
dard of living, (3) the right to be free from hunger, (4) the right to
health, and (5) the right to education,38 ultimately finding that the
construction of the wall impeded the exercise of such ICESCR
rights.3 9 Other than this advisory opinion, the ICJ has not had the
direct opportunity to adjudicate legal issues arising from ICESCR
rights. By contrast, regional human rights systems have demon-
strated more normative developments on economic, social and cul-
tural rights (such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
35. See INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, COURTS AND THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCES OF JUSTICIABILITY 23-64 (2008),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a7840562.html (defining the content,
scope, justiciability, and interpretations of ESC rights in domestic courts through princi-
ples and case law examples).
36. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 180-81 (July 9).
37. Id. 1 112.
38. Id. 130.
39. Id. 133-34.
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Rights, 40 the 1948 Charter of the Organization of American
States,4' the 1969 American Convention of Human Rights, 4 2 the
1988 Additional Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 4 3 and the revised European Social Charter) .44 These latter
instruments enforce economic, social, and cultural rights accord-
ing to procedures and mechanisms specifically defined under each
regional treaty regime.4 5
International remedies for ICESCR violations thus partake more
of the nature of individual complaints mechanisms, rather than tra-
ditionally litigated inter-State disputes. It was not until December
2008 that the landmark individual complaints procedure for the
Committee was initiated through the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("Optional Protocol to the ICESCR"). 4 6 As of this writing, the
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR will enter into force after three
more State ratifications or accessions; to date only eight State Par-
ties (Argentina, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Mongolia, Spain, and Slovakia) have completed ratification
and/or accession procedures out of the thirty-nine signatory
States. 4 7 The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR empowers the
Committee to request urgent interim measures from a State Party
"as may be necessary in exceptional circumstances to avoid possible
irreparable damage to the victim or victims of the alleged viola-
tions."48 After examination of the individual communication, the
40. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S.
217, 245.
41. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, O.A.S.T.S. No. 1-C.
42. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
43. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69.
44. European Social Charter (Revised), May 3, 1996, 2151 U.N.T.S. 277 (2001).
45. See Mashood A. Baderin, The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and
the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Affica, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ACTION 139, 140 (Mashood A. Baderin & Robert McCorquodale eds.,
2007) [hereinafter RIGHTS IN AcTIoN]; Veronica Gomez, Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights in the Inter-American System, in RIGHTS IN ACTION, supra, at 167, 167-68; Robin R.
Churchill & Urfan Khaliq, Violations of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Current Use
and Future Potential of the Collective Complaints Mechanism of the European Social Charter, in
RIGHTS IN ACTION, supra, at 195, 196.
46. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights arts. 1-2, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117, Annex, at 2 (Mar. 5,
2009) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to ICESCR].
47. See Status of the Optional Protocol to ICESCR, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-3-a&chapter=4&lang
=en (last updated Oct. 20, 2012).
48. Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 46, art. 5.
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Committee transmits its views to the State Party concerned for that
State Party's consideration and action.4 9 The Optional Protocol
confers authority to the Committee to conduct confidential inquir-
ies on alleged grave or systematic violations by a State Party of
ICESCR rights, and thereafter to transmit findings and recommen-
dations to the State Party concerned.5 0 The Optional Protocol also
enables an inter-State communications procedure, culminating
with the issuance of a Committee report on the disputed matter.5 '
B. Minimum Core Obligations as the Raison d'ftre of the ICESCR
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR contains the core obligation of States
in the form of the "undertaking to take steps" to realize ICESCR
rights. 5 2 The tenor of the obligation is purposely evolutionary ("to
the maximum of available resources") and dynamic ("with a view to
progressively achieving the full realization of the rights recognized
in the present Covenant by appropriate means"), in contrast with
the discrete and readily-determinable obligation "to respect and to
ensure" civil and political rights under Article 2(1) of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).5 The Com-
mittee explains the obligation "to take steps" as one that should be
"deliberate, concrete, and targeted as clearly as possible towards
meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant,"54 with the
means to be used to fulfill the obligation to take steps being "all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legisla-
tive measures."55 Other possible appropriate measures may
include, and are not limited to, "administrative, financial, educa-
tional and social measures. "56 Most importantly, the Committee
stresses that the "principal obligation of result reflected in article
49. Id. arts. 7-8.
50. Id. art. 11.
51. Id. art. 10.
52. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec.
16, 1966, S. TRAw Doc. No. 95-19, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] ("Each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through interna-
tional assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly
the adoption of legislative measures.").
53. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction rights recognized in the present Covenant ..
54. General Comment 3, supra note 32, 1 2.
55. Id. 3.
56. Id. 1 7.
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2(1) is to take steps 'with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized' in the Covenant."57 The Com-
mittee posits that "progressive realization" entails necessary flexibil-
ity but does not deprive the ICESCR of its raison d'itre.58 As such,
States Parties to the ICESCR are obligated to "move as expedi-
tiously and effectively as possible" towards realizing ICESCR rights,
and must fully justify any "deliberately retrogressive measures"
before such measures are introduced.59
The central concept behind the general obligation under
ICESCR Article 2(1) is for States to observe the irreducible mini-
mum core obligations that exists as the raison d'etre of the ICESCR.
After examining years of State reports and practices, the Commit-
tee took the position in its 1990 General Comment 3 that there
exists a "minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at
the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights," even
when resource constraints are taken into account.60 A State Party
can only justify its failure to meet the ICESCR minimum core obli-
gation due to a lack of available resources if it shows that "every
effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition
in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obli-
gations."61 The Committee was explicit in requiring the obser-
vance of the ICESCR minimum core obligations even in times of
"economic recession," where "the vulnerable members of society
can and indeed must be protected by the adoption of relatively
low-cost targeted programmes."62 In a document called "16 May
2011 Letter to States Parties," the Committee Chairperson
reminded States that austerity programs imposed in response to
financial crises must not deviate from the minimum core content
of ICESCR obligations:
Economic and financial crises, and a lack of growth, impede
the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural
rights and can lead to retrogression in the enjoyment of those
rights. The Committee realizes that some adjustments in the
implementation of some of these Covenant rights are at times
inevitable. States Parties, however, should not act in breach of
their obligations under the Covenant.
In such cases, the Committee emphasizes that any proposed
policy change or adjustment that has to meet the following
57. Id. 9.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. 1 10.
61. Id.
62. Id. 12.
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requirements: first, the policy is a temporary measure covering
only the period of crisis; second, the policy is necessary and pro-
portionate, in the sense that the adoption of any other policy, or
a failure to act, would be more detrimental to economic, social
and cultural rights; third, the policy is not discriminatory and
comprises all possible measures, including tax measures, to sup-
port social transfers to mitigate inequalities that can grow in
times of crisis and to ensure the rights of the disadvantaged and
marginalized individuals and groups are not disproportionately
affected; fourth, the policy identifies the minimum core content of
rights, or a social protection floor, as developed by the International
Labour Organization and ensures the protection of this core content at
all times.6 3
The ICESCR minimum core obligation takes into account not
just the State's available resources, but also those resources over
which the State exercises jus disponendi (right to dispose). Identify-
ing the exact content of the minimum core obligations in each and
every case is not a static process, but rather, is one that purposely
accepts evolution according to need, scientific and technological
advancement, and other factors. 6 4 Nonetheless, the legal parame-
ters of "essential levels" or "core content" of ICESCR obligations
are determinable. A minimum core obligation refers to the essen-
tial level of each ICESCR right, "without which a right loses its sub-
stantive significance as a human right."6 5 Manisuli Ssenyonjo
describes the minimum core obligation as an "absolute interna-
tional minimum," applicable "whatever the State's level of develop-
ment and available resources" since the ICESCR minimum core
obligation entails "a basic level of subsistence necessary to live in
dignity ... the base-line below which all States must not fall, and
should endeavor to rise above." 6 6
It is from this baseline that States can move progressively towards
the full realization of ICESCR rights. Before a State may attribute
its failure to meet minimum core obligations to a lack of available
resources, the Committee explained that the State "must demon-
strate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are
63. Letter from Ariranga G. Pillay, Chairperson, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, to All States Parties to the ICESCR (May 16, 2011) (emphasis added), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/LetterCESCRtoSP6.05.12.pdf.
64. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 35, at 23.
65. MAGDALENA SEPULVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COVENANT ON EcoNOMic, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTs 366 (2003).
66. MANISULI SSENYONJo, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 66-67 (2009).
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at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those
minimum obligations."6 7
C. Identifying and Measuring Minimum Core Obligations
While it may thus appear that ICESCR minimum core obliga-
tions are a constantly evolving, and rather imprecise, conceptual
bricolage, the process of identifying the ICESCR minimum core obli-
gations is not too far removed from the usual methods of propor-
tionality analysis in judicial reasoning.68 Apart from requiring
States themselves to identify their core minimum entitlements to
ICESCR rights that apply to them and to periodically collect data
on this ICESCR baseline,69 the Committee itself has issued General
Comments specifying the minimum core content of several rights
including the right to food,70 the right to health,7 1 the right to
social security,72 and the right to water.7 3 These Comments pro-
67. General Comment 3, supra note 32, 10.
68. See generally AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALIlY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS 202-10 (2012) (on proportionality and international and national human
rights law); id. at 422-34 (on proportionality and positive constitutional rights).
69. Philip Alston, Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 Hum. RTs. Q. 332, 353 (1987) ("Each right must
therefore give rise to an absolute minimum entitlement, in the absence of which a state
party is to be considered to be in violation of its obligations. The question for the Commit-
tee is how to go about identifying the core entitlement flowing from each right recognized
in the Covenant. In the first instance, of course, the responsibility rests with the states
parties themselves."); see Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Concluding Observa-
tions of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Sweden, 1 40, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.70 (Nov. 30, 2001); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Suriname, 9,
18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/6 (une 7, 1995); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Aus-
tralia, 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.50 (Sept. 11, 2000); see also CONCLUDING OBSERVA-
TIONS OF THE U.N. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 20-26 (Leif
Holmstr6m ed., 2003) (Argentina); id. at 289-98 (Iraq); id. at 307-20 (Israel).
70. General Comment 12, supra note 32, 6-15, 17; see also Rolf Kfinnemann, The
Right to Adequate Food: Violations Related to Its Minimum Core Content, in CORE OBLIGATIONS:
BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 161, 161-83 (Audrey
Chapman & Sage Russell eds., 2002) [hereinafter CORE OBLIGATIONS] (explaining the Cov-
enant's treatment of the right to food).
71. General Comment 14, supra note 32, 1 43; see also Audrey R. Chapman, Core Obli-
gations Related to the Right to Health, in CORE OBLIGATIONS, supra note 70, at 185, 185-215
(explaining the Covenant's treatment of the right to the highest attainable standard of
health).
72. General Comment 19, supra note 32, 1 59; see also Lucie Lamarche, The Right to
Social Security in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in CORE
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 70, at 87, 87-114 (explaining the Covenant's treatment of the
right to social security).
73. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Imple-
mentation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Gen-
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vide useful guidelines and benchmarks for States not just in their
country reporting duties to the Committee, but also for undertak-
ing their ongoing and regular national assessments of the "mini-
mum core content" of ICESCR protection. The Limburg
Principles on the Implementation of the ICESCR, formulated in
1986 by a distinguished group of international law experts and rep-
resentatives of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights, the
International Labour Organisation, the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World
Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Economic
and Social Council, emphasize the "subsistence" quality of the min-
imum core obligations under the ICESCR: "States Parties are obli-
gated, regardless of the level of economic development, to ensure
respect for minimum subsistence rights for all." 7 4 The implication
of the ICESCR minimum core obligations, according to Robert E.
Robertson, is that the State has the obligation:
[T]o intrude without limit into both private and state resources
previously used for other purposes, in order to ensure that its
population receives "core" entitlements. In other words, there
is an assumption, though a rebuttable one in the eyes of the
Committee, that every state possesses sufficient resources for
subsistence purposes if they define resources broadly enough
and are sufficiently aggressive in resource acquisition.75
Robertson proposes examining different types of resources-
human resources, technological resources, information resources,
natural resources, and financial resources-in order to empirically
measure a State's compliance with ICESCR obligations.76 The UN
Commission on Human Rights has also urged States to "consider
identifying specific national benchmarks designed to give effect to
the minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of mini-
mum essential levels of each of the [ICESCR] rights . . . ."" Aca-
demic literature has since developed helpful guidance on
quantitative measurements, analytical indicators, and empirical
methodologies to determine the "minimum core obligation" of
eral Comment No. 15 (2002), 1 37, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter General Comment 15].
74. Comm'n on Human Rights, Note Verbale Dated 5 December 1986 from the Per-
manent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to
the Centre for Human Rights, 1 25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17 (Jan. 8, 1987).
75. Robert E. Robertson, Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the
'Maximum Available Resources'to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 Hum. RTs.
Q. 693, 702 (1994).
76. Id. at 702-13.
77. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 1993/14, Rep. on the 49th Sess., Feb. 1-Mar. 12,
1993, ESCOR, Supp. No. 3, E/CN.4/1993/122, at 88, 1 7 (Feb. 26, 1993).
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ICESCR rights, considering the peculiar resource constraints, gov-
ernmental capabilities, and population needs unique to various
States Parties.78 While ICESCR minimum core obligations are
inherently dynamic as defined by States in conjunction and consul-
tation with the Committee, these core entitlements remain deter-
minable precisely due to the periodic dialogic processes between
the ICESCR State Parties and the Committee.
Furthermore, some domestic constitutional court practices
already reflect gainful acceptance of the ICESCR minimum core
obligations. In its landmark judgment in Government of South Africa
v. Grootboom, the South African Constitutional Court defined mini-
mum core obligations as "determined generally by having regard
to the needs of the most vulnerable group that is entitled to the
protection of the right in question."79 The South African Constitu-
tional Court noted that for purposes of the particular case, it did
not yet have the comparable information-income, unemploy-
ment, availability of land, poverty, differences between city and
rural communities, economic and social circumstances, and history
of a country-at its disposal to determine the minimum core con-
tent of the right to housing as recognized in South Africa.80 The
German Constitutional Court tied the concept of a "minimum
level of existence" (Existenzminimum) to the fundamental consti-
tutional duty of the State to "ensure persons the minimum condi-
tions for a dignified existence." 8' Admittedly, these are distinct
practices of both the German and South African Constitutional
Courts that have developed according to their own legal traditions
and receptivity to international law. Some scholars validly raise the
78. See generally George S. McGraw, Defining and Defending the Right to Water and Its
Minimum Core: Legal Construction and the Role of NationalJurisprudence, 8 Lov. U. CHI. INT'L L.
REv. 127 (2011) (arguing for a "minimum core" standard and reviewing a variety of domes-
tic examples of its implementation); Sital Kalantry, Joyceln E. Getgen, & Steven Arrigg
Koh, Enhancing Enforcement ofEconomic, Social, and Cultural Rights Using Indicators: A Focus on
the Right to Education in the ICESCR, 32 Hum. RTs. Q. 253 (2010) (proposing the develop-
ment of "analytic indicators" in a structure-process-outcome framework to define state obli-
gations and to measure compliance, focusing on the right to education); EDWARD
ANDERSON, USING QUANTITATIVE METHODS TO MONITOR GOVERNMENT OBUGATIONS IN
TERMS OF THE RIGHTS To HEALTH AND EDUCATION (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.
cesr.org/downloads/Quantitative%20Methods%20for%2Measuring%20ESCR.pdf; Eitan
Felner, A New Frontier in Economic and Social Rights Advocacy? Turning Quantitative Data into a
Tool for Human Rights Accountability, 9 SUR INT'L J. HuM. RTs. 109 (2008). On auditing
national government policies in light of the ICESCR, see the methodology developed in
Radhika Balakrishnan & Diane Elson, Auditing Economic Policy in the Light of Obligations on
Economic and Social Rights, 5 ESSEx Hum. RTs. REV. 1, 1-19 (2008).
79. Gov. of South Afica v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 31.
80. Id. 11 31-32.
81. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 35, at 24 (citing BVERFGE 40, 121 (133)).
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concern that "in general, the direct effect of [ICESCR and similar]
treaties is marginal to social and economic rights litigation in the
courts examined: courts rarely relied on or even cited international
or regional treaty instruments in their written opinions." 2
The presence of indeterminacy admittedly generates some com-
plexity in the process of identifying the ICESCR minimum core
obligations at any given point in time.83 Host States confronted
with conflicting fiscal priorities between socioeconomic protection
and investor compensation during economic emergencies will
inevitably have to establish that prioritization of public funds is
indeed for the purpose of maintaining the minimum essential
levels mandated by the ICESCR minimum core obligation. This
analysis will require proof of the actual content of the ICESCR min-
imum core obligations in a given factual setting.
A host State advancing this preliminary argument need not be
overburdened by the onus probandi. As gleaned from the foregoing
benchmarks provided by the Committee and the comparative
domestic jurisprudence interpreting the ICESCR minimum core
obligations, it is indeed possible to determine the "essential levels"
of each ICESCR right. This may be achieved by referring to the
following: (1) the State's available resources for its disposal at the
time of the economic emergency, (2) the nature and needs of vul-
nerable domestic groups during the economic emergency, (3) the
insufficiency of present government efforts to satisfy the ICESCR
minimum core obligation and a demonstrable need for more fiscal
intervention to directly provide such "essential levels," and (4) the
clear intent of the government to provide for the public interest,
and not merely to use the ICESCR core minimum obligation as a
subterfuge or pretext to avoid payment of investor compensation.
The ICESCR General Comments can also provide guidance to
States as they make ICESCR-compliant calibrations of socio-eco-
nomic protections within their jurisdictions. A host State that is a
party to the ICESCR has also itself (presumably) submitted the
mandatory initial report to the Committee, setting out the ICESCR
minimum core obligations applicable within its jurisdiction.84 The
82. Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks, Introduction to COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDI-
CIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 1, 33
(Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008).
83. See Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept
in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 113, 164-73 (2008).
84. See ICESCR, supra note 52, arts. 16, 17; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
Rules of Procedure of the Committee, r. 58-65, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1990/4/Rev. I (Sept. 1,
1993).
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Committee's Annual Reports to the UN Economic and Social
Council under the 1503 Reporting Procedure also independently
examine situations in countries that have not submitted such initial
reports.85 The Committee can also cross-reference State reported
data with quantitative indicators and primary data collected by
other specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the
WHO, the International Labour Organization, the Food and Agri-
culture Organization, and UNESCO. 86
D. Applicability of ICESCR Minimum Core Obligations to Emergencies
A final preliminary consideration for host States advancing the
ICESCR minimum core obligations is that the minimum floor or
obligatory baseline of socioeconomic protection applies both in
times of stability and emergency. Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR
does not have a specific derogation or public emergency provision.
ICESCR Article 4 merely operates to permit narrow limitations to
ICESCR rights as "determined by law only in so far as this may be
compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the pur-
pose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society."8 7
The Office of the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights inter-
prets this limitation to mean that "[t] here is no express permission
under human rights law for States to derogate from their obliga-
tions in relation to economic, social and cultural rights during
emergencies, disasters or armed conflicts."88  According to the
Committee, "because core obligations are non-derogable, they con-
tinue to exist in situations of conflict, emergency, and natural disas-
ter."89 Consequently, the Committee finds that "[w]hen grouped
together, the core obligations establish an international minimum
threshold that all developmental policies should be designed to
respect . . . . If a national or international anti-poverty strategy
does not reflect this minimum threshold, it is inconsistent with the
85. See International Norms and Standards Relating to Disability: § 3.2 1503 Procedure of the
Economic and Social Council, U.N. ENABLE, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/
comp203.htm#3.2 (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
86. Manuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Examination of State Obli-
gations, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 36-70 (Sarah
Joseph & Adam McBeth eds., 2010).
87. ICESCR, supra note 52, art. 4.
88. OFF. OF U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: FACT SHEET No. 33, at 25, U.N. Sales No. E.08-
44591 (2008).
89. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Poverty and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/10 (May 10,
2001).
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legally binding obligations of the State party."90 The ICESCR mini-
mum core obligation thus remains applicable even when the
State's fiscal resources are strained to the hilt by economic emer-
gencies, precisely since this is the key raison d'itre of the ICESCR.91
III. COMPENSATION FOR NON-EXPROPRIATION BREACHES: LESS
SCIENCE, MORE ART
In determining compensation for breaches of non-expropriation
standards in investment treaties, it should be recalled that "valua-
tion, although employing broad principles of economics, is as
much an art as it is a science. Each approach may yield a different
result and which approach offers the best or better framework is a
determination made in the light of the facts of a case."92
Although arbitral tribunals refer to the general law of interna-
tional responsibility to determine compensation for breaches of
non-expropriation standards in investment treaties, such as the
FET standard, the valuation process has been inconsistent, espe-
cially when an economic emergency is at issue.
A. "Fair Market Value" as the Default Standard
Since the origin of the basis for compensation for breaches of
non-expropriation standards is the law of state responsibility, which
merely refers to "financially assessable damage" under Article 36 of
the 2001 ASR,93 it is reasonable to assume that the latter would not
always require equivalence with "fair market value." The first
reported investment award, Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL)
v. Sri Lanka, involved an armed conflict that destroyed the physical
assets of the joint venture company in which the investor held
shareholdings.94 In that case, the claimant investor argued that the
attack on the property exceeded the requirements of military
90. Id. 1 17.
91. Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAw: Six DECADES AFTER THE UDHR AND BEYOND 49, 78 (Mashood A. Baderin &
Manisuli Ssenyonjo eds., 2010) ("Given the nature of the rights protected under the
ICESCR, the existence of a general limitations clause in Article 4, and the fact that states
are not required to do more than what the maximum available resources permit, deroga-
tions from the ICESCR in situations of conflict, war, emergency and natural disaster would
appear to be unnecessary.")
92. MARK KANTOR, VALUATION FOR ARBITRATION: COMPENSATION STANDARDS, VALUA-
TION METHODS, AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 14 (2008) (citing In re Winstar Communications Inc.,
348 B.R. 234, 274 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005)).
93. 2001 ASR, supra note 1, art. 36.
94. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award on
Merits and Damages, 3 (June 21, 1990).
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necessity, while Sri Lanka argued that the investor knowingly
assumed the risk by investing in an area already endangered by the
presence of a separatist movement.95 The AAPL tribunal held that
Sri Lanka breached the treaty standard requiring "full protection
and security" of investment by failing to exercise due diligence to
communicate with the staff on the ground to minimize the risk of
destruction.9 6 The AAPL tribunal limited the compensation award
to the actual value of the claimant investor's shareholding in the
joint venture company, noting that lost profits or future earnings
(lucrum cessans) were not appropriate and should not be awarded
since the case did not involve unlawful expropriation claims or lia-
bility for the unilateral termination of a State contract.97
In contrast, the reported arbitral awards involving the 2001-2002
Argentine financial crisis demonstrate a trend favoring the "fair
market value" standard as the standard of compensation for repa-
rations owed by Argentina to investors for the breach of non-expro-
priation standards (e.g., the FET standard, full protection and
security standard, and national treatment). The awards in El Paso,
LG&E, Impregilo, Sempra, Azurix, Enron, CMS, BG Group, Suez, and
Total determined compensation for breaches of non-expropriation
standards according to the "fair market value" standard of compen-
sation defined in the provision on expropriation in the investment
treaty.98 The award in Compafiia de Aguas del Aconquija SA and
Vivendi Universal SA effectively applied the "fair market value" stan-
dard as a method of compensation for expropriation as well as
breaches of non-expropriation standards. 99
The reference to "fair market value" as the default standard
arises mainly from the broad scope of arbitrator discretion over the
constituent elements of "compensation" under the general law of
reparations in the 2001 ASR. In the 2011 award in El Paso Energy
95. Id. 1 28, 32.
96. Id. I 85(B).
97. Id. 1 102-06.
98. See, e.g., El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/
15, Award, 752 (Oct. 27, 2011); Impregilo SpA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/17, Final Award, 378, 381 (June 21, 2011); Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 1 402-04 (Sept. 28, 2010); Azurix Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 11 424, 442 Uune 23, 2006);
Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 453 (May 22,
2007); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, 1 410 (Apr. 25, 2005); Nat'l Grid PLC v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL,
Award, 263, 275 (Nov. 3, 2008); BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL,
Final Award, 422 (Dec. 24, 2007).
99. Compania de Aguas del Aconquija SA v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3,
Award, 15 8.2.8-8.2.11 (Aug. 20, 2007).
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International Company v. Argentina,100 the arbitral tribunal con-
curred with the tribunal's view in SD Myers v. Canada'01 that:
[T] he silence of the treaty indicates the intention of the drafters
"to leave it open to tribunals to determine a measure of com-
pensation appropriate to the specific circumstances of the case,"
adding that "whatever precise approach is taken, it should
reflect the general principle of international law that compensa-
tion should undo the material harm inflicted by a breach of an
international obligation." 102
As a result, arbitral tribunals dealing with the 2001-2002 Argen-
tine financial crisis awarded compensation invoking the definition
of the "fair market value" in the International Glossary of Business
Valuation Terms:
The price, expressed in terms of cash equivalents, at which
property would change hands between a hypothetical willing
and able buyer and hypothetical willing and able seller, acting at
arm's length in an open and unrestricted market, when neither
is under compulsion to buy or sell and when both have reasona-
ble knowledge of the relevant facts. 03
The above definition ideally assumes perfectly competitive mar-
kets and information between market players to arrive at the opti-
mal arm's length price. The objectivity of this value is based on
available market data and the exercise of professional judgment. 0 4
While the above definition has been widely adhered to by arbitral
tribunals that dealt with the Argentine financial crisis,1 05 the
awards themselves demonstrate uneven constructions of elements
that constitute "fair market value." 0 6 This broad "fair market
value" standard is not synonymous with the prescribed definition
of compensation under Article 36 of the 2001 ASR, which only
refers to "financially assessable damage, including loss of profits
100. El Paso Energy Int'1 Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 1 698-742.
101. S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), First Partial Award, 11 309, 315
(Nov. 13, 2000).
102. El Paso Energy Int'1 Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 701.
103. AM. Soc'v oF APPRAISERS, ASA BUSINESS VALUATION STANDARDS 27 (2009).
104. SABAliI, supra note 2, at 103-04.
105. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, 1 402 (Apr. 25, 2005); Nat'l Grid PLC v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL,
Award, 1 263 n.99 (Nov. 3, 2008); Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/16, Award, 1 405 n.160 (Sept. 28, 2007); El Paso Energy Int'l Co., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/15, 1 702 n.678; Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/
01/12, Award, 424 n.354 (June 23, 2006).
106. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 1 422, 428, 430-31; Nat'1
Grid PLC, UNCITRAL, 1 275; Sempra Energy Int'l, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 1 411-12,
415; El Paso Energy Int'1 Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 1 712; Azurix Corp., ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/12, 11 425-33.
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insofar as it is established."1 0 7 The ILC views this type of compensa-
tion as intended solely to "address the actual losses incurred as a
result of the internationally wrongful act . . .. It is not concerned
to punish the responsible State, nor does compensation have an
expressive or exemplary character."108 The arbitral awards and
international decisions surveyed by the ILC likewise did not advo-
cate an all-encompassing "fair market value" standard to determine
compensation.1 09 The International Tribunal on the Law of the
Sea in M/VSaiga (No. 2), for example, excluded certain items from
compensation, such as expenses incurred due to compliance with
procedures "in the exercise of the normal functions of a flag State." 10
B. Valuation Methods and Components of "Fair Market Value"
Using the broad definition of "fair market value" as the default
standard of compensation thus admits some inherent uncertainty
as to the tribunal's choice of a valuation method and the compo-
nents that it would accept for estimating "fair market value." The
arbitral awards that dealt with the asr-2002 Argentine crisis reflect
the uncertain methodologies adopted by the tribunals.' While
the Sempra tribunal initially clarified that compensation was unnec-
essary if the host State and claimant investor could agree on other
modes of redress, 12 it ultimately imposed the fair market value
standard 1 3 (the standard of compensation traditionally used for
non-expropriation breaches of the BIT) as the level of compensa-
tion presumably required by the BIT for direct or indirect expro-
priations.114 The Sempra tribunal simply determined the level of
compensation from the difference between the value of the firm
without the Argentine governmental measures, and the value of
the firm after the imposition of such measures, thereafter adding
107. 2001 ASR, supra note 1, art. 36.
108. Id. at 245, art. 36 cmt. 4.
109. See id. art. 36.
110. Id. at 249, art. 36 cmt. 10 (emphasis added).
111. See generally Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award
and Separate Opinion (Feb. 6, 2007) (illustrating one case did not even distinguish
between compensation owed for expropriation and compensation owed for breach of non-
expropriation standards such as the fair and equitable treatment standard). Arbitrator
Professor Domingo Bello Janeiro observed in his Separate Opinion that the tribunal
should have appointed an independent expert to quantify the amount of damages to be
awarded due to the complexity of the valuation and financial issues. See id.
112. See Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Award, 400 (Sept. 28, 2007).
113. Id. 404.
114. Id. 403.
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historical damages to the resulting differential.115 The 2007 Enron
tribunal followed suit and also adopted this valuation method," 6
rejecting Argentina's argument that the claimant had received his-
torically higher returns on its investment, as "[n]either historic nor
estimated returns have been retained as a valid ground to oppose
compensation under international law."' 1 7 Despite its disinclina-
tion to import the "fair market value" standard, the 2007 BG Group
tribunal ultimately held that compensation under the "fair market
value" measure was an established practice in the assessment of
damages under customary international law." 8
At times, the "fair market value" of an investment has been
deemed to include not only the principal capital contribution, but
also all other costs presumably incurred to improve the productiv-
ity of an investment. The 2006 Azurix award included the investor's
claim for "enhanced compensation," which, due to alleged cumula-
tive breaches of other provisions of the BIT, extended well beyond
the BIT provision defining compensation for expropriation." 9
Adopting the positions taken by the tribunal in CMS v. Argentina,
and the NAFTA tribunals in the S.D. Myers, Pope & Talbot, and Feld-
man cases, the Azurix tribunal held that it was "appropriate" to use
compensation based on the fair market value of the concession
(investment), as there were cumulative breaches in this case that
extended beyond creeping or indirect expropriation covered in a
specific BIT provision.12 0 The tribunal thereafter adopted "actual
investment" (and not standard "book value" or the value at which
an asset is pegged in a company balance sheet) as the valuation
methodology.' 2 ' Applying this method, the ultimate compensation
awarded by the Azurix tribunal included the concession price, addi-
tional capital contributions for the concession, and actual litigation
costs, but the tribunal rejected Azurix's claims for consequential
damages, as well as its theory of restitution for "unjust
enrichment." 22
115. Id. 412, 415.
116. Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 17 363,
388-89 (May 22, 2007).
117. Id. 1 370.
118. BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 1 422-99 (Dec.
24, 2007).
119. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 1 409
(June 23, 2006).
120. See id. It 419-24.
121. Id. 425.
122. Id. 428-32, 438.
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Among the Argentine awards that dealt with the issue of repara-
tions for breaches of the BIT beyond expropriation, the 2005 CMS
award is demonstrably the most illuminating on the alternative
resort to compensation as a form of reparations under general
international law. 123 At the outset, the CMS tribunal reiterated that
compensation "is only called for when the damage is not made
good by restitution," and that there are a plethora of methods for
financially assessing damage, such as the "asset value" or "replace-
ment cost" approach, the "comparable transaction" approach, the
"option" approach, and the discounted cash flow (DCF)
approach. 124 While declaring that " [r]estitution is by far the most
reliable choice to make the injured party whole," the CMS tribunal
explicitly acknowledged that the Argentine "crisis cannot be
ignored and it has specific consequences on the question of repa-
ration." 25 The tribunal did not explain what these consequences
were, but rather went on to acknowledge that in the absence of a
compensation provision for non-expropriation breaches of the
BIT, "the cumulative nature of the breaches ... is best dealt with by
resorting to the standard of fair market value."126
Notably, the arbitral tribunal in National Grid PLC v. Argentina127
attempted to distinguish between the effect of governmental mea-
sures per se on the loss of investment value, and the independent
impact of economic crisis on the value of an investment; however,
the tribunal's differentiation appears methodologically idiosyn-
cratic.128 While the National Gid tribunal applied the DCF method
123. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, 11 399-469 (Apr. 25, 2005).
124. Id. 401, 403. The "replacement cost" approach looks at the cost of replacing
the asset or investment, while the "comparable transaction" approach looks at how an
investment or asset is priced in similarly situated transactions. Id. 403. The "option"
approach looks at alternative uses of an asset, and the net price of the asset given the costs
and benefits of such alternative uses. Id. The discounted cash flow (DCF) approach
adjusts the acquisition cost of an asset or investment using a discount rate applied to the
anticipated duration or maturity of an investment. Id. For a more detailed explanation of
these methods, see KANTOR, supra note 92, at 7-26; Anthony Charlton, Valuation
Approaches and the Financial Crisis, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOC (Nov. 29, 2011), http://
kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/11/29/valuation-approaches-and-the-financial-cri-
sis-part-1-market-methods/.
125. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 406.
126. Id. 1 410.
127. Nat'l Grid PLC v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL, Award, 274 (Nov. 3,
2008).
128. Id. ("The Tribunal turns now to the task of assessing the quantum of compensa-
tion for breach of Respondent's obligations under the Treaty to provide 'fair and equitable
treatment' as well as 'protection and constant security.' According to the compensatory
principles set forth above, the compensation should reflect the loss of value of the Claim-
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as the method to determine the loss of fair market value of an
operating business entity, it recognized that the 2001-2002 Argen-
tine economic crisis should be considered in ascertaining the
appropriate discount rate.129 The tribunal thereafter employed a
comparable transactions analysis, to arrive at a proxy value of
National Grid's shares at the time of the Argentine governmental
measures as well as the economic crisis, in order to justify its choice
of a much lower base value to be discounted ($52.8 million) than
that proposed by the Claimant's expert ($320.8 million),o30 as well
as a discount rate (12%) that was significantly higher than that
used by the Claimant's expert.' 3 ' The result was indeed a much
lower compensation award ($53.59 million) than the amount
sought by the investor ($112.4 million),132 but the viability of this
approach depended considerably upon the similarity or sub-
stitutability between the proxy transaction and the actual invest-
ment subject of the case. The tribunal acknowledged the
imperfections of this approach but maintained that its method at
least "appropriately reflects the impact of the [Argentine govern-
ment's] Measures, while still recognizing that, because of the eco-
nomic and social crisis, the situation of the Argentine economy was
definitely not 'business as usual."'"133
In contrast, the 2011 Impregilo award did not refer to the fair
market value standard at all but rather awarded compensation lim-
ited solely to the actual principal or capital contributions of the
claimant investor.134 The Impregilo tribunal agreed with the Chorzdw
standard and understood that "Impregilo should in principle be
placed in the same position as it would have been, had Argentina's
unfair and inequitable treatment of Impregilo's investment not
occurred." 35 The tribunal was quick to acknowledge, however,
that this ex ante restitution was in no way a precise or definitive
process: "it would be unreasonable to require precise proof of the
ant's shares in Transener as a result of the Measures and other actions taken by the govern-
ment of the Argentine Republic. As indicated above, the Tribunal recognizes that the
Measures were taken at a time of economic crisis and that it is part of the task of the
Tribunal, in calculating the quantum of compensation, to assess the effect of such crisis,
irrespective of the Measures, on the application of the Regulatory Framework.").
129. Id. 275, 282.
130. Id. 11 279, 287-88.
131. Id. 289.
132. Id. 1 265, 296.
133. Id. 290.
134. Impregilo SpA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Final Award,
1 380-81 (June 21, 2011).
135. Id. 361.
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extent of the damage sustained by Impregilo. Instead, reasonable
probabilities and estimates have to suffice as a basis for claims for
compensation."1 3 6 The Impregilo tribunal then conducted a fact-
intensive analysis, reaching the conclusion that the failure of the
concession (the investment subject of this case) was attributable in
part to the claimant investor, as well as to the acts or failures of
Argentina in implementing measures during its 2001-2002 eco-
nomic crisis.' 3 7 Due to the "shared responsibility for the failure of
the concession," the Impregilo tribunal deemed it "inappropriate to
calculate damages on the basis of customary economic parameters
such as a cost or asset based method or an income method.
Instead, the damages to be paid by the Argentine Republic to com-
pensate for unfair and inequitable treatment should be deter-
mined on the basis of a reasonable estimate of the loss that may
have been caused to Impregilo."' 3 8 Compensation was awarded
only according to the actual capital contribution of Impregilo, and
not for any potential gains from the concession.139
Finally, it should be noted that the breadth of the "fair market
value" standard has been recently criticized. The 2011 El Paso v.
Argentina award shows a telling divide between the majority's use of
the broad "fair market value" standard, and the narrower defini-
tion preferred by dissenting arbitrator Brigitte Stern.14 0 Stern's dis-
sent argued that the tribunal "should only take into account what a
willing buyer and a willing seller could foresee at the time of the
interference with the investor's rights."1 4 1 Relying on the Chorz6w
standard,14 2 the El Paso majority rejected this narrower view of com-
pensation.1 4 3 Instead, the El Paso majority used an Income-Based
Approach in the form of the DCF method of valuation, an
approach in line with the Expert's Reports and the practice of
other arbitral tribunals in cases involving Argentine emergency
measures in CMS, Enron, and Sempra.14 4
As may be seen in the above approaches taken in different arbi-
trations arising from Argentina's governmental measures during its
136. Id. 371.
137. See id. 11 362-70.
138. Id. 11 376-78.
139. Id. 1 379-81.
140. See El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award (Oct. 27, 2011).
141. Id. It 702-03.
142. Id. 1 705.
143. Id. It 705-12.
144. Id. 1 711-12.
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2001-2002 financial crisis, regardless of the valuation method used,
arbitral tribunals eventually refer to the "fair market value" stan-
dard to determine the quantum of compensation. 1 4 5 In reaching
for the "fair market value" of an investment as the level of compen-
sation, arbitral tribunals (with the exception of the National Grid
tribunal) did not manifestly differentiate between price effects that
were endogenously caused by the Argentine governmental mea-
sures and price effects that could have been exogenously caused by
the systemic financial crisis as a whole.146
Under the Chorzdw standard, the injured party is to be returned
to its position had the injury not occurred. 147 By equating the
broad "fair market value" standard with the expectancy interest
underlying compensation in the law of international responsibility,
arbitral tribunals ultimately ascertain the quantum of compensa-
tion under considerably elastic parameters. When the tribunals
rejected Argentina's unique version of the necessity defense
(which sought the full inapplicability of the entire investment
treaty in self-judged emergency situations), they did not take into
account the possible independent and exogenous effect of the
2001-2002 financial crisis in determining ultimate value of invest-
ment loss or damage.14 8 None of the tribunals also had the oppor-
tunity to consider the possible weight of good faith compliance
with ICESCR minimum core obligations at the time of the 2001-
2002 crisis, since Argentina tailored its defenses according to a
sweeping necessity argument. 149 The result was that the damages
assessed by several tribunals under the "but for the measures"
method (e.g., by subtracting the "with measures" investment value
from the "without measures" investment value), impliedly attrib-
uted damage to the investment entirely to Argentina's governmen-
145. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, 1 402 (Apr. 25, 2005); Nat'l Grid PLC v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL,
Award, 1 263 n.99 (Nov. 3, 2008); Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/16, Award, 1 405 (Sept. 28, 2007); El Paso Energy Int'l Co., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/15, 702; Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12,
Award, 1 424 (June 23, 2006).
146. See Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award,
363, 370, 388-89 (May 22, 2007); Azurix Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 1 409,
419-24; CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 1 401, 403.
147. Andrea Saldarriaga & Mark Kantor, Calculating Damages: Arbitrators, Counsel, and
Experts Can Do Better than They Have in the Past, in INVESTING WITH CONFIDENCE: UNDERSTAND-
ING POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 196, 222 (Kevin W. Lu, Gero
Verheyen & Srilal M. Perera eds., 2009).
148. DESIERTO, supra note 6, at 145-236.
149. See, e.g., EDF Int'l S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, 11
1153, 1161, 1163 (June 11, 2012).
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tal measures, without consideration for exogenous causes such as
market volatility.1 50 In such cases where a tribunal finds that the
host State did not commit a direct or indirect expropriation, but
only a breach of a non-expropriation standard such as the FET
standard, it strains credulity that the very same treaty standard of
compensation ("fair market value") would be immediately trans-
posed into situations that do not involve State-sanctioned property
takings.15 1 The 2001 ASR did not provide for an automatic equiva-
lence between "fair market value" and compensation.1 5 2
C. Mitigation of Compensation under the General International Law
of Reparations
Tribunals that have dealt with economic emergencies such as the
2001-2002 Argentine financial crisis have been silent on the issue
of mitigation of compensation arising from investor conduct.
Compensation under Article 36 of the 2001 ASR assesses damage
from the perspective of the injured State, but also reaches valua-
tion determinations with the intent of reaching an "equitable" out-
come between the injuring and injured State. 15 3  The ILC
acknowledges that the scope of reparations may be affected by the
degree to which the party injured by a breach of an international
obligation exercises prudence to mitigate damages occasioned by
the injury:
A further element affecting the scope of reparation is the ques-
tion of mitigation of damage. Even the wholly innocent victim
of wrongful conduct is expected to act reasonably when con-
fronted by the injury. Although often expressed in terms of a
"duty to 'mitigate"', this is not a legal obligation which itself
gives rise to responsibility. It is rather that a failure to mitigate
by the injured party may preclude recovery to that extent.15 4
150. See, e.g., id. 1182-85.
151. See WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES ON THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN DIREcr INVESTMENT,
at III(1)-(10), available at http://italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf; Ligia Catherine
Arias Barrera, Lack of Definition of Compensation in International Investment Disputes for Non-
Expropriation Claims: Is There an Appropriate Mechanism to Determine It?, 10 REVISTA MER-
CATORiA 75, 113 (2011).
152. See 2001 ASR, supra note 1, art. 36.
153. Id. at 247-48, art. 36 cmt. 7 ("As to the appropriate heads of compensable damage
and the principles of assessment to be applied in quantification, these will vary, depending
upon the content of particular primary obligations, an evaluation of the respective [behavior/ of
the parties and, more generally, a concern to reach an equitable and acceptable outcome.") (emphasis
added).
154. Id. at 228-29, art. 31 cmt. 11.
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Several investment arbitral tribunals have applied a similar con-
cept of mitigation of losses.155 The arbitral tribunal in Middle East
Cement v. Egypt treated the duty to mitigate as a "general principle
of law" that formed part of the applicable rules of international law
to the dispute,15 6 a position also accepted by the arbitral tribunal in
CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic.157
Applying the concept of mitigation to economic emergencies, it
should be material for the host State to present evidence, not just
to dispute the investors' financial assessment of their losses, but
also to establish its actual fiscal predicament in view of its continu-
ing obligations to provide the "essential levels" of the ICESCR min-
imum core obligations. To the extent that compliance with the
ICESCR minimum core obligations was duly disclosed to the inves-
tor at the time of the establishment of the investment in the form
of specific assurances 1 5 8 or as a central part of its regulatory
fabric,15 9 and the host State acted in good faith to comply with
such obligations, 6 0 investors can rightfully be presumed to have
expected that the host State would and could not depart from
these obligations during an economic emergency. On the basis of
these expectations, arbitral tribunals should thus consider whether
the investor acted to mitigate his losses in anticipation of the host
State's reasonable implementation of the ICESCR minimum core
obligations during the economic emergency.
155. SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
322-25 (2008); IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN INTER-
NATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw 122-26 (2009).
156. Middle E. Cement Shipping & Handling Co. S.A. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/
99/6, Award, 167 (Apr. 12, 2002).
157. CME Czech BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 482 (Sept. 13,
2001).
158. See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, 1 24 (June 8, 2009).
159. See Anderson v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3, Award, 55-59
(May 19, 2010) (where the tribunal accepted that Costa Rica had established the centrality
of its banking and administrative regulations as part of the regulatory fabric to which the
investment was subject).
160. See Saluka Investments BV (Neth.) v. Czech Republic at 1 307 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2006) ("A foreign investor protected by the Treaty may in any case properly expect that the
Czech Republic implements its policies bonafide by conduct that is, as far as it affects the
investors' investment, reasonably justifiable by public policies and that such conduct does
not manifestly violate the requirements of consistency, transparency, even-handedness and
non-discrimination.").
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D. Other Interpretations of "Compensation" under General
International Law
Other institutions, also dealing with emergencies and "compen-
sation" under the law of international responsibility, have not
resorted to the broad "fair market value" standard frequently used
by tribunals that have dealt with the 2001-2002 Argentine financial
crisis. As seen below, "financially assessable damage" as the mea-
sure of compensation under the general law of reparations need
not be as expansive as the International Glossary of Business
Terms' definition of "fair market value."
1. "Past Performance" Measure in the UN Compensation
Commission
The UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) was established in
1991 by the UN Security Council to establish a procedure for pay-
ment of claims and compensation for losses and damage suffered
from Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait.16 1 In its Decision, "Proposi-
tions and Conclusions on Compensation for Business Losses," the
UNCC held that "compensation may only be claimed for the loss
suffered during the relevant period [of loss resulting from Iraqi
invasion and occupation of Kuwait] ...... The method of valua-
tion should therefore be one that focuses on past performance
rather than on forecasts and projections into the future."16 2 The
relevant Security Council resolutions establish the international
responsibility of Iraq as expressly accepted by the Iraqi Govern-
ment, and set up the UNCC to process claims of losses and dam-
ages arising from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.16 3
The UNCC method of valuation is relevant to the assessment of
compensation for breaches of non-expropriation investment treaty
standards (such as the FET standard), precisely because compensa-
tion paid in the UNCC claims was for actual losses or damages
incurred in the context of an emergency resulting from interna-
161. See S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6,1990); S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991); S.C. Res. 692, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (May 20, 1991); S.C. Res.
705, U.N. Doc. S/RES/705 (Aug. 15, 1991); S.C. Res. 706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/706 (Aug. 15,
1991); S.C. Res. 778, U.N. Doc. S/RES/778 (Oct. 2, 1992); S.C. Res. 986, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/986 (Apr. 14, 1995).
162. U.N. Compensation Commission, Decision Taken by the Governing Council of
the United Nations Compensation Commission During the Resumed Fourth Session, at
the 23rd Meeting, Held on 6th March 1992, 11 17, 19, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/9 (Mar.
6, 1992).
163. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 161; S.C. Res. 692, supra note 161; S.C. Res. 986, supra
note 161; S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
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tionally wrongful acts committed by a foreign State that were not in
the nature of direct or indirect expropriatory takings. 164 The com-
pensation paid by the UNCC was issued for damage or loss of prop-
erty from a State's internationally wrongful acts, not necessarily in
the nature of expropriation or regulatory takings. 165 While there is
a substantial amount of international practice that equates com-
pensation valuation with "fair market value," this standard is fre-
quently derived from expropriation cases, not cases involving losses
not attributable to a State's expropriatory acts.16 6
Notably, the ICJ has not yet adopted or imposed a broad "fair
market value" standard to determine the quantum of compensa-
tion owed by States for damage caused by their internationally
wrongful acts. In the 1949 Corfu Channel case, despite Albania's
non-participation, the ICJ considered Albania to be in default and
received evidence from the United Kingdom's technical experts. 6 7
The ICJ ultimately awarded compensation to the United Kingdom
based on the actual replacement cost of damaged or destroyed
British ships, and the actual cost of pensions, medical expenses,
and grants made to victims or their dependents.16 8 When con-
fronted with the non-participation of the United States on the issue
of Nicaragua's request for compensation in Military and Paramili-
tary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the ICJ held that it would
"refrain from any unnecessary act which might prove an obstacle to
a negotiated settlement." 6 9 The ICJ again referred parties to set-
tlement in the 1997 Gabdikovo-Nagymaros case, holding that both
Hungary and Slovakia were under obligations to pay to, and
receive compensation from, the other, and due to the "intersecting
wrongs by both Parties[,] ... the issue of compensation could satis-
factorily be resolved in the framework of an overall settlement."' 7 0
The evidentiary process for determining the quantum of compen-
sation is an open process that examines all relevant facts and cir-
164. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, 11 704-05 (Oct. 27, 2011).
165. Id.
166. JAMES S. CRAwFoRD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S 2001 ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 225-27 (2002).
167. Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of December 15th, 1949, 1949 I.C.J. 244, 248-49
(Dec. 15).
168. Id. at 248-50.
169. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 283-85 (June 27).
170. Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 152, 153 (Sept.
25).
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cumstances, as stressed by the ICJ in the 1974 Fisheries jurisdiction
case:
In order to award compensation the Court can only act with ref-
erence to a concrete submission as to the existence and the
amount of each head of damage. Such an award must be based
on precise grounds and detailed evidence concerning those acts
which have been committed, taking into account all relevant
facts of each incident and their consequences in the circum-
stances of the case.17'
The silence of the ICJ on the "fair market value" standard fur-
ther militates against its use to determine the quantum of compen-
sation, in the form of reparations for damages caused by a State's
internationally wrongful acts under the general law of interna-
tional responsibility. As shown by the UNCC, "past performance"
may also be a sufficient standard to approximate "financially assess-
able damage" within the ambit of compensation as defined in Arti-
cle 36 of the 2001 ASR.172
2. The Oscar Chinn Case. Compensation as an "Act of Grace,"
Rather than a Vested Right, When Losses are Incurred
Solely due to Changes in General Economic
Conditions
Compensation may also be offered by a State as an "act of grace",
rather than as a matter of vested right. In the 1934 Oscar Chinn
case, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) declined
to characterize voluntary refunds by the Belgian Government as a
form of compensation awarded through legal entitlement. 73 In
this case, the PCIJ declared that the Belgian Government did not
violate the provisions of the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye
(the Convention) when the Belgian Minister for the Colonies
issued a 1931 communication to various transport companies
(including Oscar Chinn's transport company) ordering the tempo-
rary reduction of transport tariffs for certain traded goods in the
Belgian Congo, due to the collapse of prices for such produce dur-
ing the worldwide economic crisis of the Great Depression. 74 The
communication also provided that the Belgian Colonial Adminis-
tration would reimburse the transport companies for costs or losses
171. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175, 1 76 (July 25).
172. See 2001 ASR, supra note 1, art. 36 cmt. 26 n.559; U.N. Compensation Comm'n
Governing Council, Propositions and Conclusions on Compensation for Business Losses:
Types of Damages and Their Valuation, 1 19, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/9 (Mar. 6, 1992).
173. The Oscar Chinn Case (U.K v. Belg.), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 88 (Dec.
12).
174. Id. at 71, 85-86.
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arising from the rate reductions when their statement of accounts
reflected a deficit.17 5 The Belgian Colonial Administration would
thereafter recover the reimbursements when the global economic
situation would permit the restoration of the transport tariffs to
their original levels.1 76 Under this arrangement, Union nationale
des Transports fluviaux (Unatra), a transport company in which
the Belgian Government held substantial shareholdings, received
refunds for the transport tariff reductions imposed by Belgium
pursuant to the 1931 communication.17 7
Oscar Chinn, a British national who also ran his own transport
company in the Belgian Congo, argued that the 1931 communica-
tion reduced his business to ruin due to transport tariff reductions
and refunds offered to his competitors and not to all transport
operators, which made the costs of his own transport company too
prohibitive against further operations. 1 7 Transport companies not
included in the refund scheme in the 1931 communication also
requested the Minister of the Belgian Colonies for compensation
for the losses they incurred.17 ' The Minister declined such
requests, saying that governmental assistance in the form of com-
pensation was limited to transport companies over whose rates the
Belgian Government had a right of supervision.180 In 1932, how-
ever, the Minister issued a notice, granting to all private transport-
ers "as an advance" the refund of losses suffered as a result of
transporting products whose downstream rates were reduced.181
The United Kingdom argued that Belgium's reduction of tariffs
in favor of Unatra in return for temporary monetary compensation
"made it impossible for the other fluvial transporters, including
Chinn, to retain their customers," thus enabling Unatra to exercise
a de facto monopoly incompatible with the obligation to maintain
commercial freedom and equality under the Convention.18 2 The
United Kingdom also accused Belgium of engaging in discrimina-
tory conduct contrary to the principle of equality of treatment
under the Convention and of violating Chinn's vested rights by
175. Id. at 73-74.
176. Id. at 74.
177. Id. at 70, 74.
178. Id. at 75.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 43.
181. Id. at 44.
182. Id. at 20.
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making it commercially impossible for him to continue with his
business.18 3
The PCIJ held that Belgium did not breach the guarantees of
freedom of trade, equality, and non-discrimination under the Con-
vention with the treatment afforded by the 1931 communication to
transport companies whose rates were subject to the Belgian Gov-
ernment's supervision. 84 As a transport company under the par-
ticular supervision of the Belgian Government, Unatra already
posed different terms of competition known to Chinn at the time
the he joined the river transport business.18 5 The Court held that
the competitive situation ensuing from State supervision over Una-
tra was a "possible effect of commercial competition" but did not
breach the freedom of trade and navigation.186 In view of the
Great Depression, the Belgian Government adopted temporary
measures through the 1931 communication to publicly-regulated
companies such as Unatra.187 These measures could not be
deemed to breach freedom of trade and navigation. Neither did
Belgium violate the principle of discrimination, since:
[T]he treatment accorded to Unatra was based on the special
position of that Company, as a Company under the supervision
of the Belgian Government. The special advantages and condi-
tions resulting from the measures ... were bound up with the
position of Unatra as a Company under State supervision and
not with its character as a Belgian Company. These measures, as
decreed, would have been inapplicable to concerns not under
government supervision, whether of Belgian or foreign
nationality.' 8 8
Finally, the Court denied that Chinn had any vested right to
compensation arising from the 1932 notice of the Belgian Minister
to private transporters. 89 The Court noted that the State could
not be liable for a business loss resulting from deteriorating gen-
eral economic conditions:
No enterprise - least of all a commercial or transport enterprise,
the success of which is dependent on the fluctuating level of
prices and rates - can escape from the chances and hazards
resulting from general economic conditions. Some industries
may be able to make large profits during a period of general
prosperity, or else by taking advantage of a treaty of commerce
183. See id. at 24.
184. See id. at 21.
185. Id. at 26.
186. Id. at 24.
187. See id. at 25.
188. Id. at 26.
189. Id. at 27.
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or of an alteration in customs duties; but they are also exposed
to the danger of ruin or extinction if circumstances change.
Where this is the case, no vested rights are violated by a State.190
The advances granted by the Belgian Government to private
transporters in 1932 was "ascribed to the desire of every govern-
ment to show consideration for different business interests, and to
offer them some compensation, when possible. The action of the
Government appears to have been rather in the nature of an act of
grace."19 1
The Oscar Chinn case is a unique case involving losses to a private
party that were attributed by the Court to the price effects of an
economic crisis such as the Great Depression.192 The Court did
not find a sufficient nexus of causation between the business losses
suffered by Chinn and the more favorable regulatory climate faced
by his competitors such as Unatra, other than the reinforcement of
pre-existing terms of competition between Unatra and all other
transport companies.s9 3 The Court's discussion latched on to the
failure of Chinn (or the United Kingdom) to show that the regula-
tory differentiation between State-supervised transport companies
and private transport companies was a mode of discrimination pro-
hibited by the Convention or applicable international laws.194
Since the Court found that it was the general economic conditions
of the Great Depression that caused Chinn's business losses and
not any regulatory measure of Belgium, there was no international
responsibility from which the duty to pay compensation would
arise.195 In the absence of competition laws expressly imposing a
duty upon Belgium to act (e.g., such as to exercise its governmen-
tal powers to ensure the preservation, and prevent the exacerba-
tion, of terms of competition faced by private transporters such as
Chinn), Chinn's loss of capital and profits, arising exclusively from
prevailing market conditions and the impact of the Great Depres-
sion on transport prices, could not be redressed by compensation
under international law.
As this Article has shown, compensation under the general law
of reparations for breaches of international law that are not
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 87-88; see MOHAMED BEDJAOUI, THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE SECURITY
CouNcIL: TESTING THE LEGALITY OF ITS ACrs 497 (1994) (noting remarks of Professor
Andre Gros that dissentingJudge Anzilotti considered the fact of the economic crisis at the
time as a possible).
193. Oscar Chinn, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) at 87-88.
194. Id. at 85-88.
195. Id. at 84-89.
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equivalent to expropriation need not always be assessed according
to the broad "fair market value" standard. When investment tribu-
nals use this standard to compensate breaches of non-expropria-
tion treaty standards, they problematically assume a conceptual
equivalence between the qualitative effects of an expropriation
(and the specific intent of the States Parties in providing for
"prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation in these cases),
and all other breaches of provisions in the investment treaty. This
method neglects the actual function of compensation under the
general law of international responsibility, which is to reach for an
"equitable outcome" for both the injured and injuring State. 196 As
a matter of equity, it would not be unreasonable for the arbitral
tribunal to adjust the quantum of compensation, in view of the
host State's simultaneous observance of the ICESCR minimum
core obligation during an economic emergency. Several arbitral
tribunals have relied on "equitable considerations"1 9 7 to adjust the
quantum of compensation taking into account the peculiarity of
fact-patterns on a case-by-case basis:
Because of difficulties involved in the precise assessment of dam-
ages, subjective elements present in many assessment methodol-
ogies and the need for approximations, tribunals are almost
inevitably, although to varying degrees, guided by equitable con-
siderations . . . . The notion of equity is inherently subjective ...
much depends on the personal and collective views and beliefs
of the members of the arbitral tribunal and their reading of the
facts of the case. Generally, however, in the context of an invest-
ment dispute, equitable considerations can well serve as a basis
for finding a just balance between private interests of the for-
eign investor and public interests of the respondent State.198
Equitable considerations are suited to situations where adjudica-
tion inimitably involves some discretionary ambiguity.199 Arbitral
tribunals seeking to apply compensation under Article 36 of the
2001 ASR to non-expropriation breaches of a BIT should acknowl-
edge that this exercise is largely discretionary. However, most of
the investment tribunals (save for National Grid) that held Argen-
196. See 2001 ASR, supra note 1, at 247-48; Diane A. Desierto, Calibrating Human Rights
and Investment in Economic Emergencies: Prospects of Treaty and Valuation Defenses, 9
MANCHESTERJ. INT'L EcoN. L. at 29 (forthcoming Sept. 2012) [hereinafter Desierto, Cali-
brating Human Rights].
197. See Desierto, Calibrating Human Rights, supra note 196, at 30 n.109 (listing six arbi-
tral awards relying on principles of equity).
198. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 155, at 124-26.
199. See Mark Weston Janis, The Ambiguity of Equity in International Law, 9 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 7, 25-26 (1983) (restating Lauterpacht's acceptance of the use of equity in discre-
tionary situations).
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tina liable for breach of the FET standard tended to impose the
"fair market value" standard as the standard of compensation, with-
out making equitable adjustments on account of possible exoge-
nous effects of overall market crises on the deteriorating value of
an investment. 2 0 0
As seen in the practices of the UNCC, valuation could be limited
solely to a business' "past performance" and not necessarily "lost
profits" or expected earnings, when emergencies of a scale such as
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait could also have systemic ripple effects,
environmental consequences, and other exogenous hazards that
make it difficult to ascertain the future projections of profitability
of a business.20 The Oscar Chinn case is the extreme example of a
situation where the Court attributed one transport owner's busi-
ness loss to exogenously-determined causes, such as the worldwide
Great Depression's effects on transport prices. 202 It might well
have been that the volume of transactions of Chinn's business was
too insignificant relative to the market dominance of Unatra in the
overall transport market of the Belgian Congo, thus making his
business more price-sensitive to economic downturns such as the
Great Depression. Had there been competition laws in place
already binding Belgium to intervene to protect smaller firms such
as Chinn's from monopolistic behavior during economic emergen-
cies, Chinn's transport business would probably not have been as
price-sensitive to exogenously-determined shocks such as the Great
Depression.
Government policies taken during an economic emergency
clearly will have an impact on the ultimate price or value of an
investment or business as a going concern. As will be seen below,
when a host State seeks to implement government policies that
ensure continued observance of the ICESCR minimum core obli-
gations in a time of economic emergency or financial crisis but col-
laterally injures investors by altering the expected regulatory
environment, there is a need to reassess the "financially assessable
damage" that should be compensable. 203 For example, the mini-
mum core obligations on the right to water, as discussed by the
200. See supra note 98 (citing, inter alia, LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 227 (Oct. 3, 2006); Sempra Energy
Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 486 (Sept. 28, 2007);
Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 442 (June 23,
2006)).
201. U.N. Compensation Comm'n Governing Council, supra note 172, 17, 19.
202. Oscar Chinn (U.K v. Belg.), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 86-89 (Dec. 12).
203. See infra Part IV.
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Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights includes
State obligations to "ensure access to the minimum essential
amount of water that is sufficient and safe for personal and domes-
tic uses to prevent disease" as well as to "ensure the right of access
to water and water facilities and services on a non-discriminatory
basis, especially for disadvantaged or marginalized groups."204 A
State acting to fulfill these obligations in a manner that ultimately
interferes with the expected returns on investment of an investor-
well short of a direct or indirect expropriation (and thus only
breaching a non-expropriation standard in an investment treaty)-
should not be held to the same broad "fair market value" standard
for valuing compensation.
IV. A READJUSTMENT PROPOSAL: RECASTING THE INVESTMENT
BETA AND THE COUNTRY RISK PREMIUM IN THE DISCOUNT RATE
Part III showed that, apart from the rather unrealistic definition
of the broad "fair market value" standard under perfectly competi-
tive market conditions, the same standard cannot be easily or legiti-
mately equated to compensation as designed under the general
international law of reparations in Article 36 of the 2001 ASR.2 05
For such "compensation" for breaches of non-expropriation stan-
dards (such as the FET standard) to approximate the function of
compensation under Article 36 of the 2001 ASR, the quantum of
compensation must reflect a consideration of the behavior of both
the injured party as well as the injuring party, in order to be justly
regarded as an "equitable outcome." This Part proposes to follow
this principle in the assessment of the discount rate applied to an
investment, by taking into consideration the host State's obliga-
tions to continue observing the ICESCR minimum core obligations
during economic emergencies.
A. Unpacking the Components of the Discount Rate
To recall, the discount rate is the "expected total rate of return
[that] the investor requires to commit funds to the particular
investment. It is market-driven in that it represents the expected
rates of return available in the market on other investments that
are comparable in terms of risk."206 The discount rate is applied
under a DCF valuation method, which "calculate [es] the com-
204. General Comment 15, supra note 73, 37(a), (b).
205. See supra Part III.
206. KANTOR, supra note 92, at 140.
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pany's anticipated future stream of net cash flow over a specific
future period of time, and then discounting that gross amount
back to a present-value lump sum."2 0 7 The higher the discount
rate that is used, the lower the ultimate present-value lump sum of
an investment, and vice versa. It is thus unsurprising that the dis-
count rate (which was frequently used in the valuation methodolo-
gies in the arbitral awards that dealt with the 2001-2002 Argentine
financial crisis) is one of the most heatedly contested issues in
international investment arbitration, with claimant investors seek-
ing lower discount rates (thus higher present values of their invest-
ment) and respondent States seeking higher discount rates (lower
present values of investment to be compensated). 208
The Capital Asset Pricing Model pioneered by Nobel Laureate
William Sharpe presents the standard formula to determine the
discount rate209:
fa = rf + Ba(fm - tf)
where:
rf = Risk free rate
Pa = Beta of the secutity
fm= Expected market return
(fi - rf) = Equity market premium
The investment beta is intended to measure the "sensitivity (vola-
tility) of the rate of return on an individual security (or a portfolio
of securities) to general rates of return in the public stock mar-
kets."210 The higher the investment beta, the more sensitive the
value of the investment is to the price fluctuations of the overall
market. An investment beta higher than 1.0 reflects greater uncer-
tainty, causing the discount rate to increase, and ultimately
decreases the present value of an investment.211 The equity market
premium, on the other hand, "measure [s] the additional return
the investor will require before investing in a portfolio that con-
tains such an investment, as compared with the risk-free invest-
ment."212 Variables that determine the equity risk premium have
207. Id.
208. See id. at 141. On the selection of discount rates, see Vidya Rajarao, Determining
Damages in Cross-Border Disputes, TRANSNAT'L DISPUTE MGMT., Nov. 2007, at 1, 5.
209. See WILLIAM F. SHARPE, INVESTORS AND MARKETS: PORTFOLIO CHOICES, ASSET PIuCES,
AND INVESTMENT ADVICE 96 (2006). Formula image taken from The Capital Asset Pricing
Model: An Overview, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/
06/capm.asp#axzzlulvuuDMR.
210. KANTOR, supra note 92, at 164.
211. Id. at 165.
212. Id.
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been identified to include: (1) investor risk aversion and consump-
tion preferences, (2) the health and predictability of the overall
economy, (3) information about firm earnings and cash flows, (4)
illiquidity costs (or the costs of trading the asset), (5) catastrophic
risk (e.g., "events that occur infrequently but can cause dramatic
drops in wealth"), and (6) government policy, where uncertainty
about government policy can translate into higher equity risk
premiums. 2 1 3
An investor seeking to invest in a host State that is a party to the
ICESCR should expect that State to continue fulfilling its mini-
mum core obligations during economic emergencies or financial
crises. As established above, these minimum core obligations have
to be determined dynamically over time, with particular regard to
the resource constraints of the State, the needs of its vulnerable
populations, and the Committee guidelines in the General Com-
ments for identifying what subsistence levels are sufficient at a
given point in time under a specific State Party context.2 1 4 The
precise shape or contour of the government policies taken to
observe the ICESCR minimum core obligations during an eco-
nomic crisis can vary over time. The result is that more uncertainty
as to government policy should be considered when the prospec-
tive host State for an investment is also a party to the ICESCR. The
increased uncertainty will be reflected through upward estimations
of both the investment beta (the sensitivity of the investment to the
overall fluctuations of the market) and the equity risk premium
(the additional return sought by the investor to invest in the asset,
business, or project, rather than simply purchasing a risk-free
security such as United States Treasury Bills).215
B. Adjusting the Investment Beta and the Equity Risk Premium for
Increased Uncertainty from ICESCR-Sensitive Government Policies
The investment beta is usually estimated using Ordinary Least
Squares regression, typified by a covariance function reflecting
market risk and investment-specific risk.216 Investment betas
change over time, and may not always be stable predictors of mar-
213. See Aswath Damodaran, Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation
and Implications - The 2012 Edition 6-13 (Mar. 14, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=202721 1.
214. See supra Part II.
215. See AVINASH K DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY
175-212 (1994).
216. D. Bradfield, Investment Basics XLVI. On Estimating the Beta Coefficient, 57 INVEST-
MENT ANALYSTS J. 47, 47 (2003).
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ket risk vis-i-vis investment-specific risk.217 The investment beta is
determined by two sets of parameters: "1) the degree of uncer-
tainty attached to various categories of economic events (the pro-
portional contributions of the events to market variance), and 2)
the response of the security returns to these events (relative
response coefficients). "218 Where governmental policies are
expected to be taken to fulfill ICESCR minimum core obligations
during a given economic emergency, the investment beta must
reflect the increased uncertainty arising from the State's obligation
to fulfill such ICESCR minimum core obligations.
Government policies to maintain observance of the ICESCR
minimum core obligations during economic emergencies can be
expected to have some distributional consequences, such as:
realigning fiscal priorities to guarantee subsistence levels of social
and economic goods for vulnerable civilian populations, altering
competition regulations or regulatory frameworks to better enable
access of vulnerable civilian populations to key social and eco-
nomic goods (e.g., water and other utilities), or providing incen-
tives and subsidies to other market players to produce essential
social and economic goods (such as medicine) at prices lower than
arm's length market prices. These changes of government policy
are difficult to forecast until the actual economic emergency has
occurred and the State duty to fulfill the ICESCR minimum core
obligations is defined in relation to the effect of such emergency
on the enjoyment of subsistence levels of ICESCR rights by the
State's citizens. The data used to approximate the market rate of
return, for example, might also need adjustment in view of poten-
tial market segmentations (e.g., a government policy may intro-
duce price discriminations in favor of historically vulnerable
economic groups such as the elderly, children, and women, lower
income groups or the unemployed, larger households in depressed
areas that require more welfare assistance during economic crises,
etc.). The frequency of price-distorting government intervention
for social protection during economic crises can also be scrutinized
as part of the historical data for estimating market returns and
overall volatility. Finally, country-specific risk can additionally be
taken into account when resource constraints, geographic endow-
217. See Chris Tofallis, Investment Volatility: A Critique of Standard Beta Estimation and a
Simple Way Fonard, 187 EUR.J. OPERATIONAL RES. 1358, 1360-61 (2008) (discussing a rela-
tively recent critique against using the investment beta to split up the notion of total risk
into "market risk" and "investment-specific risk").
218. Barr Rosenberg & James Guy, Prediction of Beta from Investment Fundamentals: Part
One, Prediction Criteria, 32 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 60, 64 (1976).
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ments, demographic characteristics, and other exogenous factors
outside the control of a State can end up magnifying the subsis-
tence levels actually required to meet the ICESCR minimum core
obligations.2 19 The ultimate effect of the increased uncertainty
generated from less predictable government policies of a State
party to the ICESCR should be an upward adjustment of the invest-
ment beta.
Similar reasoning regarding increased uncertainty from govern-
ment policies can be applied to the equity risk premium. A 2011
study by Lubos Pastor and Pietro Veronesi from the University of
Chicago found that apart from economic shocks and capital
impact shocks, political shocks also contribute significantly to the
risk premium, "despite being unrelated to the economic funda-
mentals Investors demand compensation for uncertainty about the
outcomes of purely political events, such as debates and negotia-
tions. Those events matter to investors because they affect the
investors' beliefs about which policy the government might adopt
in the future." 220 Political uncertainty arising from changes in gov-
ernment policies is expected to increase the equity risk premium as
well as volatilities and correlations of stock returns. 221 During an
economic emergency in which a State party to the ICESCR is
expected to continue to observe minimum core obligations, the
governmental policy changes necessitated in these circumstances
should thus be foreseen to contribute to increased uncertainty,
and ultimately, a higher equity risk premium.
As this Part has shown, upward adjustments in the investment
beta and the equity risk premium result in higher discount rates,
thus lowering present values of compensable investment.222 This is
more aligned with the "equitable outcome" envisaged for compen-
sation under the general law of reparations, which ought to apply
to the method of deriving compensation for breaches of non-
expropriation standards of investment treaties. When a host State
is able to show that it acted in good faith to observe its ICESCR
obligations during an economic emergency or financial crisis and
219. See generally Turan G. Bali & Nusret Cakici, World Market Risk, Country-Specific
Risk and Expected Returns in International Stock Markets (Oct. 14, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract~id=1489159.
220. Political shocks "arise due to learning about the political costs associated with the
potential new policies of a government." Lubos Pastor & Pietro Veronesi, Political Uncer-
tainty and Risk Premia 1, 2 (Sept. 7, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.bus.wisc.edu/finance/workshops/documents/SSRN-idl932420.pdf.
221. See id. at 24-25.
222. See supra Part W.A.
2012] 517
The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.
only collaterally injured the investment, the actual level of compen-
sable damage attributed to the host State for the investor's loss
should reflect this distinction.
V. CONCLUSION: RESTORING PROPORTIONAL COMPENSATION IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
Proportionality in international investment law is frequently
sought in the interpretation of substantive standards of investment
protection,223 but proportionality also has a significant role to play
in the more pragmatic issue of valuing compensation owed by a
host State. Proportionality nuances are never more urgent than in
the process of valuing compensation for losses incurred during
times of economic emergencies. The market price of an invest-
ment is a function of both endogenous variables (such as firm-spe-
cific characteristics and the firm's dominance of the market
relative to its overall size) as well as exogenous variables (such as
systemic risk, adaptive regulatory changes, and external competi-
tion). In an economic emergency or financial crisis, the influence
of exogenous variables on the market price of an investment will
indeed be significant. At times, however, such adverse impacts on
investment price and rate of return could be explained by good
faith compliance by a State with other international obligations
that incidentally distort the investment price and rate of return. A
State Party to the ICESCR would (and should) continue to observe
minimum core obligations towards its citizens during economic
emergencies, even if the form of its observance would call for
uncertain regulatory changes. When a State Party finds itself
breaching its investment treaty's non-expropriation standards
(such as the notoriously ambiguous FET standard), due to its good
faith observance of the ICESCR, it should not be penalized by an
arbitral tribunal that automatically transposes the Hull formula of
223. See Xiuli Han, The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in Tecmed v. Mexico,
6 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 635, 637 (2007) ("In EU law, the principle of proportionality is
becoming a constitutional principle of Europe. The principle of proportionality also exists
in international law and is spreading to various branches of it."); Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-
State Arbitration: Proportionality's New Frontier, 4 L. & ETHICS Hum. RTs. 47, 61-62 (2010)
("[An] indicator of judicialization-or, the gradual entrenchment of investment arbitra-
tion as a stable system of governance in the field of foreign direct investment-is the
deployment, by arbitrators, of modes of reasoning and doctrinal frameworks developed by
courts. Most dramatically, tribunals are in the process of embracing balancing and propor-
tionality."); Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors'
Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest - The Concept of Proportionality, in INTER-
NATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAw 75, 79-80 (Stephan W. Schill ed.,
2010).
518 [Vol. 44
ICESCR Minimum Core Obligations
"prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation for direct or indi-
rect expropriations as an overly expansive proxy of "financially
assessable damage" for compensation under the general interna-
tional law of reparations. As this Article has shown, there are ways
to equitably adjust the compensation valuation process in view of a
host State's good faith fulfillment of its minimum core obligations
under the ICESCR.
A recently observed trend in awards in the ICSID shows that
some tribunals are starting to issue more narrow compensation
awards in order to protect "reliance interests,"224 or economic
harms suffered by a party who depends on a party's foreseeable com-
pliance with its obligation. 225 Rather than reaching for expansive
"expectancy interest" protection, which would attempt to restore a
party as close as possible to the situation before contract breach
and which usually includes projecting lost profits, arbitral tribunals
such as those in Impregilo v. Argentina and National Grid PLC v.
Argentina demonstrate incipient attempts to account for the shared
impact of economic crises on both the host State as well as the
investor.226  These attempts reflect the earlier sensibilities
expressed in CMS Gas that the impact of a financial crisis should
also have "some consequences on the question of reparation," as
well as the position taken by dissenting Arbitrator Brigitte Stern in
El Paso that the value of an investment should be assessed at its
most "foreseeable" price.2 2 7
While investment arbitration tribunals to date have not fully
adopted scientifically consistent methods for valuing investment
losses suffered as a result of governmental social protection mea-
sures as well as systemic economic crises, the analysis must begin
somewhere. This Article offers one way to distinctively adjust the
valuation model for breaches of non-expropriation treaty stan-
dards, when a host State obligated to observe the ICESCR mini-
mum core obligations during the emergency must make the
political decision to impose ICESCR-compliant governmental mea-
sures that injure investor interests. By adjusting the discount rate
upwards to reflect the higher risk premium ensuing from the
224. David Collins, An Economic Justification for Reliance Remedies at ICSID (Mar.
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/david_collins/1.
225. See Robert Birmingham, Notes on the Reliance Interest, 60 WASH. L. REv. 217, 221
(1985).
226. Impregilo SpA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Final Award,
11 49-86 (June 21, 2011).
227. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, 1J 678-79 (Oct. 27, 2011).
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uncertainty of inevitable governmental policy changes to meet the
ICESCR minimum core obligations during economic emergencies,
arbitral tribunals can reach a more realistic assessment of the pre-
sent value of an investment that also factors in the independent
price impacts of the uncertainty of government behavior in
response to market volatility during these emergencies.
A host State that establishes its good faith compliance with the
ICESCR minimum core obligations during an economic emer-
gency, and who does not invoke the ICESCR as a belated pretext to
escape investor liability, should be given the benefit of equitably
adjusted compensation. This would not only be consonant with
the original intent of proportionality underlying the schema of
reparations under the law of international responsibility,228 but it
would also confirm the fundamental centrality of the ICESCR to
the regulatory fabric assumed by investors making the initial deci-
sion to invest in a State who is also a party to the ICESCR. In a time
of economic crisis, no investor can expect a host State to disavow its
ICESCR minimum core obligations to civilian populations. Thus,
when the host State's political choice to deliberately breach a non-
expropriation standard in the investment treaty arises from this
sense of good faith compliance with the ICESCR-there being no
other way to perform obligations in both treaty regimes compatibly
within the terms of Article 30(4) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties229-the quantum of compensation should be
assessed from the narrowest proportional extent to protect the
"reliance interest" of the injured investor.
Precisely since the ILC emphasizes the intrinsic importance of
the proportionality requirement to the law of reparations,23 0 it
would be contrary to the public function and just purposes of repa-
rations to require "expectancy interest" compensation levels that
beggar, punish, and extort from host States pursuing social protec-
tion measures under the ICESCR in good faith.
228. 2001 ASR, supra note 1.
229. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30(4), May 23,1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
230. 2001 ASR, supra note 1.
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